Pharmaceutical Company Threatens Blogger

Boiron, a multinational pharmaceutical company, have threatened an Italian blogger with legal action, the BMJ reports.



Many people are concerned when big pharmaceutical companies do this kind of thing. So I don't think we should make any exception merely because Boiron's pharmaceuticals happen to be homeopathic ones.



Samuel Riva, who blogs (in Italian) at blogzero.it, put up some articles critical of homeopathy

which included pictures of Boiron’s blockbuster homoeopathic product Oscillococcinum, marketed as a remedy against flu symptoms. The pictures were accompanied by captions, which joked about the total absence of any active molecules in homoeopathic preparations

Boiron wrote to Riva's internet provider threatening legal action, if the offending references to Boiron weren't taken down. They also wanted them to lock Riva out of his blog, the BMJ says. In response Riva removed the references to Boiron, including the pictures and captions, but kept the posts on homeopathy in general.



Hmmm.



Above you can see a new picture I made of a Boiron product, with some captions you may find interesting. I've made sure to limit these to quotes from Wikipedia, and from Boiron USA's own website, and some simple mathematical calculations.



Beyond that, I make no comment whatsoever.



Turone F (2011). Homoeopathy multinational Boiron threatens amateur Italian blogger. BMJ (Clinical research ed.), 343 PMID: 21840920

Pharmaceutical Company Threatens Blogger

Boiron, a multinational pharmaceutical company, have threatened an Italian blogger with legal action, the BMJ reports.



Many people are concerned when big pharmaceutical companies do this kind of thing. So I don't think we should make any exception merely because Boiron's pharmaceuticals happen to be homeopathic ones.



Samuel Riva, who blogs (in Italian) at blogzero.it, put up some articles critical of homeopathy

which included pictures of Boiron’s blockbuster homoeopathic product Oscillococcinum, marketed as a remedy against flu symptoms. The pictures were accompanied by captions, which joked about the total absence of any active molecules in homoeopathic preparations

Boiron wrote to Riva's internet provider threatening legal action, if the offending references to Boiron weren't taken down. They also wanted them to lock Riva out of his blog, the BMJ says. In response Riva removed the references to Boiron, including the pictures and captions, but kept the posts on homeopathy in general.



Hmmm.



Above you can see a new picture I made of a Boiron product, with some captions you may find interesting. I've made sure to limit these to quotes from Wikipedia, and from Boiron USA's own website, and some simple mathematical calculations.



Beyond that, I make no comment whatsoever.



Turone F (2011). Homoeopathy multinational Boiron threatens amateur Italian blogger. BMJ (Clinical research ed.), 343 PMID: 21840920

Ban These Sick Ape-Man Frankensteins

According to a new report, urgent action is required to stop scientists creating a monstrous race of apes with fully functional human brains (just as Christine O'Donnell warned us about those mice), thus causing Planet Of The Apes to come true.

OK, that's not quite what the Academy of Medical Sciences said. But judging from most of the media coverage, you might think it was.

The report is actually about "Animals containing human material" and it notes that under British law, experiments of this kind are covered by generic animal research rules, but there are no special animal-human regulations.

Should there be?

I think there should be. We as a society allow experiments on animals or animal embryos that we don't allow on humans, even on human embyros. Clearly, we need to decide what we're going to do about organisms that have both human and animal DNA, or whatever. This doesn't mean restricting it - to clear up the rules could also facilitate such research, by making it explicit what is allowed.

However, we should tread carefully here. This is an area where our intuitions can lead us astray.

Although we have absolutely no idea how to make an animal-human "hybrid", or even whether it's possible at all, the very idea of it has many people worried. It's probably a case of the uncanny valley and lots of cultural baggage (Planet of the Apes et al).

So, for whatever reason, we have a hang-up about making monstrous ape-men. Fair enough. So long as we remember that this is entirely hypothetical, and that it might, for all we know, be literally impossible.

Yet other things in this debate are very real. Over-zealous regulation of research could easily end up delaying, say, a cure for Alzheimer's for, say, 10 years. That would be dooming tens of millions of people to suffering and death.

The problem is, that's hard to picture. It's hard to imagine how bad Alzheimer's is unless you have personal experience. Even if you do, it's hard to multiply that badness by ten million anonymous, hypothetical people. "One ape-man is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic".

Delaying science is easy to do (for politicians), and hard to picture why it's bad. Whereas "a monstrous ape-man" is the exact opposite. Easy to imagine - just look at the media interest in this story - yet nowhere close to being reality.

This is a problem. The human mind and the way we think about these issues is a problem. Even when that mind is safely inside a nice normal human skull.

Ban These Sick Ape-Man Frankensteins

According to a new report, urgent action is required to stop scientists creating a monstrous race of apes with fully functional human brains (just as Christine O'Donnell warned us about those mice), thus causing Planet Of The Apes to come true.

OK, that's not quite what the Academy of Medical Sciences said. But judging from most of the media coverage, you might think it was.

The report is actually about "Animals containing human material" and it notes that under British law, experiments of this kind are covered by generic animal research rules, but there are no special animal-human regulations.

Should there be?

I think there should be. We as a society allow experiments on animals or animal embryos that we don't allow on humans, even on human embyros. Clearly, we need to decide what we're going to do about organisms that have both human and animal DNA, or whatever. This doesn't mean restricting it - to clear up the rules could also facilitate such research, by making it explicit what is allowed.

However, we should tread carefully here. This is an area where our intuitions can lead us astray.

Although we have absolutely no idea how to make an animal-human "hybrid", or even whether it's possible at all, the very idea of it has many people worried. It's probably a case of the uncanny valley and lots of cultural baggage (Planet of the Apes et al).

So, for whatever reason, we have a hang-up about making monstrous ape-men. Fair enough. So long as we remember that this is entirely hypothetical, and that it might, for all we know, be literally impossible.

Yet other things in this debate are very real. Over-zealous regulation of research could easily end up delaying, say, a cure for Alzheimer's for, say, 10 years. That would be dooming tens of millions of people to suffering and death.

The problem is, that's hard to picture. It's hard to imagine how bad Alzheimer's is unless you have personal experience. Even if you do, it's hard to multiply that badness by ten million anonymous, hypothetical people. "One ape-man is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic".

Delaying science is easy to do (for politicians), and hard to picture why it's bad. Whereas "a monstrous ape-man" is the exact opposite. Easy to imagine - just look at the media interest in this story - yet nowhere close to being reality.

This is a problem. The human mind and the way we think about these issues is a problem. Even when that mind is safely inside a nice normal human skull.

Violent Brains In The Supreme Court

Back in June, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a Californian law banning the sale of violent videogames to children was unconstitutional because it violated the right to free speech.

However, the ruling wasn't unanimous. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion. Unfortunately, it contains a whopping misuse of neuroscience. The ruling is here. Thanks to the Law & Neuroscience Blog for noticing this.

Breyer says (on page 13 of his bit)

Cutting-edge neuroscience has shown that “virtual violence in video game playing results in those neural patterns that are considered characteristic for aggressive cognition and behavior.”

He then cites this fMRI study from 2006. It's from the same group as this one I wrote about recently.

Breyer quotes this study as part of a discussion of the evidence linking violent video game use to violence. I have nothing to say about this, but I will point out than the fact that violent crime fell heavily in America after 1990, which is when the Super Nintendo and Sega Megadrive were invented.

Anyway, does this study show that playing violent games causes aggressive brain activity? Not exactly. By which I mean "no".

They scanned 13 young men playing a shooter game. The main finding was that during "violent" moments of the game, activity in the rostral ACC and the amygdala activity falls. At least this is the interpretation the authors give.

OK, but even if this neural response is "characteristic for aggressive cognition and behavior", it only lasted a few seconds. There's no evidence at all that this causes any lasting effects on brain function, or behaviour.

The real problem though is that the whole thing is based on the theory that violence is associated with reduced amygdala (and rACC) activity.

The authors cite various studies to this effect, but they don't distinguish between reduced activity as an immediate neural response to violence, as in this study, and reduced activity in people with high exposure to violent media, in response to non-violent stimuli.

This is rather like saying that because having a haircut reduces your total hair, and because bald people have no hair, haircuts cause baldness. Short-term doesn't automatically become long-term.

Besides, the whole idea that amygdala deactivation = violence is a bit weird because they used to destroy people's amydalas to reduce violent aggression in severe mental and neurological illness:

Different surgical approaches have involved various stereotactic devices and modalities for amygdaloid nucleus destruction, such as the injection of alcohol, oil, kaolin, or wax; cryoprobe lesioning; mechanical destruction; diathermy loop; and radiofrequency lesioning...

Lovely. It even worked sometimes, apparantly. Although it killed 4% of people. You can't reduce the activity of a region much more than by destroying it, yet destroying the amygdala reduced violence, or at the very least, didn't make it worse.

The truth is that aggression isn't a single thing. Everyone knows that there are two main kinds, "in cold blood" and "in the heat of the moment". Killing someone in a spontaneous bar brawl is one thing, but carefully planning to sneak up behind them and stab them is quite another.

Just based on what we know about the rare cases of amygdala-less people, I would imagine that destroying the amygdala would reduce violence "in the heat of the moment", which is motivated by anger and fear. The kind of patients who got this surgery seem to have been that kind of violent person, not the cold calculating kind.

So, even if violent video games reduced amygdala activity long term, that would probably reduce some kinds of violence.

Weber, R., Ritterfeld, U., & Mathiak, K. (2006). Does Playing Violent Video Games Induce Aggression? Empirical Evidence of a Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study Media Psychology, 8 (1), 39-60 DOI: 10.1207/S1532785XMEP0801_4

Blind Spots & Braintrust

This is a review of two recently published books about ethics: Bazerman and Tenbrunsel's Blind Spots (not to be confused with this one), and Patricia Churchland's Braintrust.

The pair may come from the same publisher (Princeton), but they couldn't be more different.


Blind Spots is a good book. It tells a story in a clear and compelling fashion, which is what a book is for.

The story is that we often act unethically, not because we're faced with ethical questions and decide to pick the "bad" option, but because we fail to see that there is an ethical issue at all.

This is not the same as saying that 'the road to hell is paved with good intentions'. That old phrase warns against trying to be good and, as a result, causing evil, because your plans go wrong. Blind Spots is saying, even if all of your attempts to be good work out just fine, you might still cause evil despite that.

For example, you could be a good employee, who never calls in sick unnecessarily, kind to your friends and colleagues, and a generous charity donor.

Unfortunately, you're an accountant connected to Enron, and your work - ultimately - consists of defrauding innocent people. But of course, you don't think of it like that, because we don't tend to think about things "ultimately".

Which is hard to disagree with. At worst, you could say it's obvious, although I think it's still something we ought to be reminded of. That's not all there is to the book, though: it also discusses how this happens and suggests ways to avoid it within organizations.

For example, the authors give an example of how setting up rewards and punishments to "make people be ethical", can make them less so, by encouraging people to think of the issue as a personal trade-off between gain and loss, rather than an ethical dilemma - what the authors call "ethical fading".

A day-care centre was annoyed at the fact that some parents were picking up their children late. This was antisocial because it meant staff had to work late into the evening.

So they started charging parents a late fee. Not a big one, but enough to send people a message: this is wrong, don't do. But in fact what happened was that late pickups became more common.

Previously, many people were making an effort to be on time, as a matter of principle. Once the fees were in place, it stopped being an ethical issue and just became a financial trade-off: is it worth paying the fee to get an extra hour?

Of course, you could make the fees higher to get around this, but even then, you've caused ethical fading, and you'll be relying on the sanctions from that point on.


Braintrust, by contrast, is just not a good read. The bulk of the book consists of discussions of various neurotransmitters and brain areas and how they may be related to human social behaviour. Oxytocin, for example, may make us behave all trusting and kindly, as it's involved in maternal bonding. There's a long discussion of the neurochemistry of male sexual behaviour in voles.

It's not clear how this is relevant to ethics. Whether it's oxytocin that does it, or something else, and whether voles are a useful model of human behaviour or not, clearly sometimes we trust people and sometimes we don't. That's psychology. And biology can't yet explain it.

Churchland doesn't claim that the various biological concepts that she covers can fully explain anything, and she doesn't vouch that all of these findings are rock solid. Which is good, because they can't, and they're not. So why spend well over half of the book talking about them?

Churchland's big idea seems to be that human morality emerges out of our more general capacity for sociability. Hence all the stuff about oxytocin and "the social brain". OK. But I'd have said that's a given - there's obviously some relation between sociability and morality.

I think there is an interesting idea in here, albeit not very clearly expressed, namely that morality isn't a special function of the brain, but just one of the many forms in which our social cognition can take.

In other words, I think the claim is that ethics isn't just related to sociability, it is sociability. Even asocial animals care about their own welfare, in terms of pleasure and pain; social ones become social when they extend this caring to others; intelligent social animals including humans and maybe some primates also have a system for inferring the motivations and thoughts of others.

At the end of the book, Churchland stops reviewing neuroscience, and starts talking about the implications for philosophy. This is best section of the book, but it's too short.

Churchland makes the interesting point, for example, that when we are considering philosophical "ethical dilemmas", like the famous trolley problems, we may not be applying any kind of ethical "rules" as such. Rather, she thinks that our moral reasoning is pretty much a kind of pattern recognition based on previous experience - like all our other social reasoning.

Someone who'd just read a book about the horrors of Stalinism might tend to adopt an anti-consequentialist, every-life-is-sacred approach. Whereas if you'd just watched a movie in which the hero, reluctantly but rightly, decides to sacrifice one guy to save many other people, would do the opposite. Then the ethical "rules" might be confabulated to cover it.

This is a nice idea. It's open to criticism, but it's a serious suggestion, and one that deserves a decent discussion. Sadly, there isn't one. If only there were more room in the book for this kind of stuff - but oxytocin covers so many pages.

Basically, the good parts of this book are not about the brain at all.

Reading Braintrust is like going on date but then bumping into an annoying friend who insists on coming along for dinner. Jesus, The Brain, you want to say. I like you and all, but seriously, you are getting in the way right now.

Links: Other blog reviews.

My Grandma: Neurophilosopher

John Galliano is the British designer who got videoed being a bit unpleasant and ended up in court on racism charges.


His defence is that he was drunk and/or high. Which from the video he fairly obviously was. But here's an interesting quote from his lawyer:

Some things may have come out of his mouth that didn’t come from his brain.

So where did they come from, then... hmm. Don't answer that.

I doubt that the lawyer was actually trying to say that Galliano's mouth was moving of its own accord or under the control of some other organ. Rather she was expressing the idea that "my brain" in this context doesn't mean, literally, the whole of the grey blob of neurons in my skull.

Rather "my brain" means, roughly, "that part of my brain responsible for rational thought".

My grandmother once talked about a friend who'd had a stroke. She said, as far as I can remember, "Sometimes the stroke means you can't talk or walk, which is bad enough, but sometimes it gets into your brain and that can be really nasty."

Of course she knew that all strokes happen in the brain. What she was saying was that some strokes, but not all, affect the part of the brain responsible for "me" as a person - thoughts, emotions, and so forth.

So, this is all anecdotal evidence, but there seems to be a popular, common-sense temptation to believe in the "me part" of the brain, a tendency which neuroscientists are not immune to and which can lead to dubious conclusions.

I'd love to see someone do a proper study of what non-neuroscientists, ideally people with little exposure to neuroscience like children, think about the brain. A bit like this, but really in depth. I suspect that you'd find that many of the ideas underpinning today's neuroscience had their origins in pre-scientific, common sense intuitions.

We neuroscientists are human, and we have neuro-intuitions too. But if neuroscience has taught us anything, it's not to trust those.

How To Set Someone On Fire

I've just come across a deeply disturbing paper: Attempted ignition of petrol vapour by lit cigarettes and lit cannabis resin joints

The authors set out to discover whether you could set petrol on fire by dropping a lit cigarette or hash joint onto it. It turns out, surprisingly, that you can't.

Thirty nine (39) ignition attempts that involved exposing lit commercial cigarettes, hand-rolled cigarettes and cannabis resin joints to petrol vapour were undertaken; ignition was not achieved in any of the scenarios. In addition, a single attempt to ignite petrol vapour emanating from a pool of liquid fuel was effected with a smouldering piece of cannabis resin; no ignition occurred. In all cases the petrol was clearly present within the limits of flammability since ignition was subsequently effected using a naked flame.

It's just not hot enough. Apparantly, for the "hot surface" ignition of petrol vapor to occur, you need a surface with a peak temperature of about 1000 degrees C. Puffing on a cigarette can raise the temperature at the tip to maybe 950 degrees, and while you're not puffing, it's more like 700. A cigarette lighter, however, will do it.

Well, you learn something new every day. Although I'm still not going to be lighting up in the garage any time soon. Don't try this at home.

Anyway, what makes this paper so sinister is the context. This research was done as part of a murder enquiry:

...the consideration of hot surface ignition of petrol vapour was of legitimate interest since the defence proposed the ignition of petrol vapour by “bombers” (small pieces of hot cannabis resin) falling from a lit cannabis resin joint when the smoker puffed on the joint.

The details of the murder aren't specified but reading between the lines, I guess someone burned someone else to death by covering them in petrol and lighting them, and their defence was that it was an accident caused by their joint.

It gets worse. There are pictures.

"The second set of experiments was designed to recreate circumstances specific to the murder case under investigation."

What was the murder case in question? I think I've found it, and if so, the good news is that the guy was found guilty. Stewart Blackburn, 18, was convicted of the murder of his girlfriend Jessica McCagh, in her bedroom, using petrol. The dates fit, as does the fact that the murder took place in Scotland. The paper comes from an English forensic company, but it acknowledges the help of various Scottish legal and police experts.

Jewell RS, Thomas JD, & Dodds RA (2011). Attempted ignition of petrol vapour by lit cigarettes and lit cannabis resin joints. Science & justice : journal of the Forensic Science Society, 51 (2), 72-6 PMID: 21605828

Amy Bishop, Neuroscientist Turned Killer

Across at Wired, Amy Wallace has a long but riveting article about Amy Bishop, the neuroscience professor who shot her colleagues at the University of Alabama last year, killing three.

It's a fascinating article because of the picture it paints of a killer and it's well worth the time to read. Yet it doesn't really answer the question posed in the title: "What Made This University Scientist Snap?"

Wallace notes the theory that Bishop snapped because she was denied tenure at the University, a serious blow to anyone's career and especially to someone who, apparantly, believed she was destined for great things. However, she points out that the timing doesn't fit: Bishop was denied tenure several months before the shooting. And she shot at some of the faculty who voted in her favor, ruling out a simple "revenge" motive.

But even if Bishop had snapped the day after she found out about the tenure decision, what would that explain? Thousands of people are denied tenure every year. This has been going on for decades. No-one except Bishop has ever decided to pick up a gun in response.

Bishop had always displayed a streak of senseless violence; in 1986, she killed her 18 year old brother with a shotgun in her own kitchen. She was 21. The death was ruled an accident, but probably wasn't. It's not clear what it was, though: Bishop had no clear motive.

Amy had said something that upset her father. That morning they’d squabbled, and at about 11:30 am, Sam, a film professor at Northeastern University, left the family’s Victorian home to go shopping... Amy, 21, was in her bedroom upstairs. She was worried about “robbers,” she would later tell the police. So she loaded her father’s 12-gauge pump-action shotgun and accidentally discharged a round in her room. The blast struck a lamp and a mirror and blew a hole in the wall...

The gun, a Mossberg model 500A, holds multiple rounds and must be pumped after each discharge to chamber another shell. Bishop had loaded the gun with number-four lead shot. After firing the round into the wall, she could have put the weapon aside. Instead, she took it downstairs and walked into the kitchen. At some point, she pumped the gun, chambering another round.

...[her mother] told police she was at the sink and Seth was by the stove when Amy appeared. “I have a shell in the gun, and I don’t know how to unload it,” Judy told police her daughter said. Judy continued, “I told Amy not to point the gun at anybody. Amy turned toward her brother and the gun fired, hitting him.”

Years later Bishop, possibly with the help of her husband, sent a letter-bomb to a researcher who'd sacked her, Paul Rosenberg. Rosenberg avoided setting off the suspicious package and police disarmed it; Bishop was questioned, but never charged.

Wallace argues that Bishop's "eccentricity", or instability, was fairly evident to those who knew her but that in the environment of science, it went unquestioned because science is full of eccentrics.

I'm not sure this holds up. It's certainly true that science has more than its fair share of oddballs. The "mad scientist" trope is a stereotype but it has its basis in fact and it has done at least since Newton; many say that you can't be a great scientist and be entirely 'normal'.

But the problem with this, as a theory for why Bishop wasn't spotted sooner, is that she was spotted sooner, as unhinged, albeit not as a potential killer,by a number of people. Rosenberg sacked her, in 1993, on the grounds that her work was inadaquate and said that "Bishop just didn’t seem stable". And in 2009, the reason Bishop was denied tenure in Alabama was partially that one of her assessors referred to her as "crazy", more than once; she filed a complaint on that basis.

Bishop also published a bizarre paper in 2009 written by herself, her husband, and her three children, of "Cherokee Lab Systems", a company which was apparantly nothing more than a fancy name for their house. There may be a lot of eccentrics in science, but that's really weird.

So I think that all of these attempts at an explanation fall short. Amy Bishop is a black swan; she is the first American professor to do what she did. Hundreds of thousands of scientists have been through the same academic system and only one ended up shooting their colleagues. If there is an explanation, it lies within Bishop herself.

Whether she was suffering from a diagnosable mental illness is unclear. Her lawyer has said so, but he would; it's her only defence. Maybe we'll learn more at the trial.#

H/T: David Dobbs for linking to this.

Amy Bishop, Neuroscientist Turned Killer

Across at Wired, Amy Wallace has a long but riveting article about Amy Bishop, the neuroscience professor who shot her colleagues at the University of Alabama last year, killing three.

It's a fascinating article because of the picture it paints of a killer and it's well worth the time to read. Yet it doesn't really answer the question posed in the title: "What Made This University Scientist Snap?"

Wallace notes the theory that Bishop snapped because she was denied tenure at the University, a serious blow to anyone's career and especially to someone who, apparantly, believed she was destined for great things. However, she points out that the timing doesn't fit: Bishop was denied tenure several months before the shooting. And she shot at some of the faculty who voted in her favor, ruling out a simple "revenge" motive.

But even if Bishop had snapped the day after she found out about the tenure decision, what would that explain? Thousands of people are denied tenure every year. This has been going on for decades. No-one except Bishop has ever decided to pick up a gun in response.

Bishop had always displayed a streak of senseless violence; in 1986, she killed her 18 year old brother with a shotgun in her own kitchen. She was 21. The death was ruled an accident, but probably wasn't. It's not clear what it was, though: Bishop had no clear motive.

Amy had said something that upset her father. That morning they’d squabbled, and at about 11:30 am, Sam, a film professor at Northeastern University, left the family’s Victorian home to go shopping... Amy, 21, was in her bedroom upstairs. She was worried about “robbers,” she would later tell the police. So she loaded her father’s 12-gauge pump-action shotgun and accidentally discharged a round in her room. The blast struck a lamp and a mirror and blew a hole in the wall...

The gun, a Mossberg model 500A, holds multiple rounds and must be pumped after each discharge to chamber another shell. Bishop had loaded the gun with number-four lead shot. After firing the round into the wall, she could have put the weapon aside. Instead, she took it downstairs and walked into the kitchen. At some point, she pumped the gun, chambering another round.

...[her mother] told police she was at the sink and Seth was by the stove when Amy appeared. “I have a shell in the gun, and I don’t know how to unload it,” Judy told police her daughter said. Judy continued, “I told Amy not to point the gun at anybody. Amy turned toward her brother and the gun fired, hitting him.”

Years later Bishop, possibly with the help of her husband, sent a letter-bomb to a researcher who'd sacked her, Paul Rosenberg. Rosenberg avoided setting off the suspicious package and police disarmed it; Bishop was questioned, but never charged.

Wallace argues that Bishop's "eccentricity", or instability, was fairly evident to those who knew her but that in the environment of science, it went unquestioned because science is full of eccentrics.

I'm not sure this holds up. It's certainly true that science has more than its fair share of oddballs. The "mad scientist" trope is a stereotype but it has its basis in fact and it has done at least since Newton; many say that you can't be a great scientist and be entirely 'normal'.

But the problem with this, as a theory for why Bishop wasn't spotted sooner, is that she was spotted sooner, as unhinged, albeit not as a potential killer,by a number of people. Rosenberg sacked her, in 1993, on the grounds that her work was inadaquate and said that "Bishop just didn’t seem stable". And in 2009, the reason Bishop was denied tenure in Alabama was partially that one of her assessors referred to her as "crazy", more than once; she filed a complaint on that basis.

Bishop also published a bizarre paper in 2009 written by herself, her husband, and her three children, of "Cherokee Lab Systems", a company which was apparantly nothing more than a fancy name for their house. There may be a lot of eccentrics in science, but that's really weird.

So I think that all of these attempts at an explanation fall short. Amy Bishop is a black swan; she is the first American professor to do what she did. Hundreds of thousands of scientists have been through the same academic system and only one ended up shooting their colleagues. If there is an explanation, it lies within Bishop herself.

Whether she was suffering from a diagnosable mental illness is unclear. Her lawyer has said so, but he would; it's her only defence. Maybe we'll learn more at the trial.#

H/T: David Dobbs for linking to this.

Did My Genes Make Me Do It?

A curious legal case from New York raises some interesting issues:

Court Rejects Judge’s Assertion of a Child Pornography Gene

According to the NYT:

A federal appeals court in Manhattan overturned a 6.5 year sentence in a child pornography case on Friday, saying the judge who imposed it improperly found that the defendant would return to viewing child pornography "because of an as-of-yet undiscovered gene."

The judge, Gary L. Sharpe, was quoted as saying, "It is a gene you were born with. And it’s not a gene you can get rid of," before he sentenced the defendant...

A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said in ruling on the defendant’s appeal, "It would be impermissible for the court to base its decision of recidivism on its unsupported theory of genetics."

Now I think we can all agree that judges shouldn't be handing down sentences on the basis of entirely hypothetical genes. However, things becomes a bit less clear if we imagine that the defendant did have a verified genetic abnormality. What then?

As chance would have it, this has just happened in Britain. On Thursday, former delivery driver Alan Potsbury, or as he was known to his colleagues, "Al The Paedo", was convicted of... well, the obvious.

Anyway, Potsbury has Klinefelter's Syndrome, aka XXY syndrome. Normally, women have two X chromosomes, while men have an X and a Y chromosome. People with Klinefelter's have three sex chromosomes, two X and a Y. They're male, but can experience various symptoms as a result of their extra X, although these are often pretty subtle, and the condition often goes undiagnosed.

Now I have no idea whether Potsbury's responsibility for his crime is lessened by the fact that he had a genetic disorder. And I certainly don't want to suggest that Klinefelter's "makes people into paedophiles", not least because in the vast majority of cases, it doesn't.

However, let's assume just for the sake of argument, that in this particular case he wouldn't have done what he did if it weren't for his extra chromosome. Or let's consider any hypothetical case where someone committed a crime "because of" a certain gene. Does this mean, as Judge Sharpe was suggesting, that it means their behaviour will be unlikely to change, and hence that heavy sentences are justified since rehabilitation won't work?

No. The fact that someone's past behaviour was associated with a gene doesn't tell us anything about how easy it would be to change it.

Being a Christian as opposed to a Muslim is, as far as we know, nothing to do with genetics; it's purely a matter of how you were brought up. Yet it's incredibly difficult to change. Many Christians and many Muslims spend their lives trying to make the heathens adopt the true faith and yet the number of successful conversions either way is tiny.

Hair colour, on the other hand, is entirely genetic. Yet it's easy to change. Just buy some bleach and some dye and you can have whatever hair you like. Or if you don't want hair at all, shave it off. You can't change your hair-colour genes, but you can make them irrelevant.

Back to Potsbury, even if we did accept that his paedophilia was in some way a result of his Klinefelter's, that wouldn't mean he was doomed to reoffend. Some behaviours are harder to change than others. Some are more genetic than others. But we can't assume that the one implies the other.

Did My Genes Make Me Do It?

A curious legal case from New York raises some interesting issues:

Court Rejects Judge’s Assertion of a Child Pornography Gene

According to the NYT:

A federal appeals court in Manhattan overturned a 6.5 year sentence in a child pornography case on Friday, saying the judge who imposed it improperly found that the defendant would return to viewing child pornography "because of an as-of-yet undiscovered gene."

The judge, Gary L. Sharpe, was quoted as saying, "It is a gene you were born with. And it’s not a gene you can get rid of," before he sentenced the defendant...

A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said in ruling on the defendant’s appeal, "It would be impermissible for the court to base its decision of recidivism on its unsupported theory of genetics."

Now I think we can all agree that judges shouldn't be handing down sentences on the basis of entirely hypothetical genes. However, things becomes a bit less clear if we imagine that the defendant did have a verified genetic abnormality. What then?

As chance would have it, this has just happened in Britain. On Thursday, former delivery driver Alan Potsbury, or as he was known to his colleagues, "Al The Paedo", was convicted of... well, the obvious.

Anyway, Potsbury has Klinefelter's Syndrome, aka XXY syndrome. Normally, women have two X chromosomes, while men have an X and a Y chromosome. People with Klinefelter's have three sex chromosomes, two X and a Y. They're male, but can experience various symptoms as a result of their extra X, although these are often pretty subtle, and the condition often goes undiagnosed.

Now I have no idea whether Potsbury's responsibility for his crime is lessened by the fact that he had a genetic disorder. And I certainly don't want to suggest that Klinefelter's "makes people into paedophiles", not least because in the vast majority of cases, it doesn't.

However, let's assume just for the sake of argument, that in this particular case he wouldn't have done what he did if it weren't for his extra chromosome. Or let's consider any hypothetical case where someone committed a crime "because of" a certain gene. Does this mean, as Judge Sharpe was suggesting, that it means their behaviour will be unlikely to change, and hence that heavy sentences are justified since rehabilitation won't work?

No. The fact that someone's past behaviour was associated with a gene doesn't tell us anything about how easy it would be to change it.

Being a Christian as opposed to a Muslim is, as far as we know, nothing to do with genetics; it's purely a matter of how you were brought up. Yet it's incredibly difficult to change. Many Christians and many Muslims spend their lives trying to make the heathens adopt the true faith and yet the number of successful conversions either way is tiny.

Hair colour, on the other hand, is entirely genetic. Yet it's easy to change. Just buy some bleach and some dye and you can have whatever hair you like. Or if you don't want hair at all, shave it off. You can't change your hair-colour genes, but you can make them irrelevant.

Back to Potsbury, even if we did accept that his paedophilia was in some way a result of his Klinefelter's, that wouldn't mean he was doomed to reoffend. Some behaviours are harder to change than others. Some are more genetic than others. But we can't assume that the one implies the other.

The Ethics of Getting as High as a Kite

Are drugs good or bad?

I mean, in the ethical sense. Medically, all drugs have potential harms variously associated with use, long-term use, overdose, etc. Politically, by buying illegal drugs, you're probably ultimately funding criminals and terrorists (although you might well blame prohibition, not drugs, for that). But setting that aside, assuming no-one gets harmed as a result: is it morally wrong to take recreational drugs per se?

It's an important question, because your opinion about this will influence your opinions about less abstract, more immediate issues: whether cannabis ought to be sold in coffee shops, how many years you should spend in jail for dealing coke.

However, no-one really asks this question, directly. The medical and the political aspects of drugs are endlessly debated, but after listening to these arguments for a while, you'll realize that while people on both sides talk about public health risks and harm reduction, most of the time they're really just disagreeing about the abstract question of whether taking drugs for fun is acceptable.

Here's the two major schools of thought as I see them. There are those who see no problem with recreational drug use, assuming no-one gets hurts. If it feels good, it is good. If it makes people happy, what's not to like? If people want to enjoy themselves in that particular way, it's no-one else's business. Call this the 'hedonist' view.

On the other hand, there are those who see drug use as a shameful escape from reality. There's more to life than "having fun", life is serious. You ought to be out there doing something, not just sitting around with a silly grin on your face. That's cheating, getting enjoyment for nothing. Call this the 'puritan' school.

People differ on which one they favour, but most of us identify with both to some extent. Few people are puritan enough to forgo all of life's pleasures, not even a quiet drink or a hot bath. Few hedonists would be happy if their own kids announced that they had no ambition to succeed in any kind of career, they'd just live off their inheritance and buy heroin.

As a whole, society has a mixed view. We have a puritanical objection to people who just take drugs and do nothing else with their lives; "junkies", "crackheads", "alkies". But we have no problem with drug use by people who clearly have engaged with the world, and succeeded.

Musicians, actors, and other stars take industrial quantities of drugs. Everyone knows it. It's not even an open secret in most cases, it's just open. Even gossip columnists don't notice unless someone gets so far gone that they do something funny. We don't care, because, whether or not we actually like their work, they're not just drug users, they're also doing their jobs.

The Ethics of Getting as High as a Kite

Are drugs good or bad?

I mean, in the ethical sense. Medically, all drugs have potential harms variously associated with use, long-term use, overdose, etc. Politically, by buying illegal drugs, you're probably ultimately funding criminals and terrorists (although you might well blame prohibition, not drugs, for that). But setting that aside, assuming no-one gets harmed as a result: is it morally wrong to take recreational drugs per se?

It's an important question, because your opinion about this will influence your opinions about less abstract, more immediate issues: whether cannabis ought to be sold in coffee shops, how many years you should spend in jail for dealing coke.

However, no-one really asks this question, directly. The medical and the political aspects of drugs are endlessly debated, but after listening to these arguments for a while, you'll realize that while people on both sides talk about public health risks and harm reduction, most of the time they're really just disagreeing about the abstract question of whether taking drugs for fun is acceptable.

Here's the two major schools of thought as I see them. There are those who see no problem with recreational drug use, assuming no-one gets hurts. If it feels good, it is good. If it makes people happy, what's not to like? If people want to enjoy themselves in that particular way, it's no-one else's business. Call this the 'hedonist' view.

On the other hand, there are those who see drug use as a shameful escape from reality. There's more to life than "having fun", life is serious. You ought to be out there doing something, not just sitting around with a silly grin on your face. That's cheating, getting enjoyment for nothing. Call this the 'puritan' school.

People differ on which one they favour, but most of us identify with both to some extent. Few people are puritan enough to forgo all of life's pleasures, not even a quiet drink or a hot bath. Few hedonists would be happy if their own kids announced that they had no ambition to succeed in any kind of career, they'd just live off their inheritance and buy heroin.

As a whole, society has a mixed view. We have a puritanical objection to people who just take drugs and do nothing else with their lives; "junkies", "crackheads", "alkies". But we have no problem with drug use by people who clearly have engaged with the world, and succeeded.

Musicians, actors, and other stars take industrial quantities of drugs. Everyone knows it. It's not even an open secret in most cases, it's just open. Even gossip columnists don't notice unless someone gets so far gone that they do something funny. We don't care, because, whether or not we actually like their work, they're not just drug users, they're also doing their jobs.

How To Fool A Lie Detector Brain Scan

Can fMRI scans be used to detect deception?

It would be nice, although a little scary, if they could. And there have been several reports of succesful trials under laboratory conditions. However, a new paper in Neuroimage reveals an easy way of tricking the technology: Lying In The Scanner.

The authors used a variant of the "guilty knowledge test" which was originally developed for use with EEG. Essentially, you show the subject a series of pictures or other stimui, one of which is somehow special; maybe it's a picture of the murder weapon or something else which a guilty person would recognise, but the innocent would not.

You then try to work out whether the subject's brain responds differently to the special target stimulus as opposed to all the other irrelevant ones. In this study, the stimuli were dates, and for the "guilty" volunteers, the "murder weapon" was their own birthday, a date which obviously has a lot of significance for them. For the "innocent" people, all the dates were random.

What happened? The scans were extremely good at telling the "guilty" from the "innocent" people - it managed a 100% accuracy with no false positive or false negatives. The image above shows the activation associated with the target stimulus (birthdays) over and above the control stimuli. In two seperate groups of volunteers, the blobs were extremely similar. So the technique does work in principle, which is nice.

But the countermeasures fooled it entirely, reducing accuracy to well below random chance. And the countermeasures were very simple: before the scan, subjects were taught to associate an action, a tiny movement of one of their fingers or toes, with some of the "irrelevant" dates. This, of course, made these dates personally relevant, just like the really relevant stimuli, so there was no difference between them, making the "guilty" appear "innocent".

Maybe it'll be possible in the future to tell the difference between brain responses to really significant stimuli as opposed to artifical ones, or at least, to work out whether or not someone is using this trick. Presumably, if there's a neural signiture for guilty knowledge, there's also one for trying to game the system. But as it stands, this is yet more evidence that lie detection using fMRI is by no means ready for use in the real world just yet...

Ganis G, Rosenfeld JP, Meixner J, Kievit RA, & Schendan HE (2010). Lying in the scanner: Covert countermeasures disrupt deception detection by functional magnetic resonance imaging. NeuroImage PMID: 21111834

How To Fool A Lie Detector Brain Scan

Can fMRI scans be used to detect deception?

It would be nice, although a little scary, if they could. And there have been several reports of succesful trials under laboratory conditions. However, a new paper in Neuroimage reveals an easy way of tricking the technology: Lying In The Scanner.

The authors used a variant of the "guilty knowledge test" which was originally developed for use with EEG. Essentially, you show the subject a series of pictures or other stimui, one of which is somehow special; maybe it's a picture of the murder weapon or something else which a guilty person would recognise, but the innocent would not.

You then try to work out whether the subject's brain responds differently to the special target stimulus as opposed to all the other irrelevant ones. In this study, the stimuli were dates, and for the "guilty" volunteers, the "murder weapon" was their own birthday, a date which obviously has a lot of significance for them. For the "innocent" people, all the dates were random.

What happened? The scans were extremely good at telling the "guilty" from the "innocent" people - it managed a 100% accuracy with no false positive or false negatives. The image above shows the activation associated with the target stimulus (birthdays) over and above the control stimuli. In two seperate groups of volunteers, the blobs were extremely similar. So the technique does work in principle, which is nice.

But the countermeasures fooled it entirely, reducing accuracy to well below random chance. And the countermeasures were very simple: before the scan, subjects were taught to associate an action, a tiny movement of one of their fingers or toes, with some of the "irrelevant" dates. This, of course, made these dates personally relevant, just like the really relevant stimuli, so there was no difference between them, making the "guilty" appear "innocent".

Maybe it'll be possible in the future to tell the difference between brain responses to really significant stimuli as opposed to artifical ones, or at least, to work out whether or not someone is using this trick. Presumably, if there's a neural signiture for guilty knowledge, there's also one for trying to game the system. But as it stands, this is yet more evidence that lie detection using fMRI is by no means ready for use in the real world just yet...

Ganis G, Rosenfeld JP, Meixner J, Kievit RA, & Schendan HE (2010). Lying in the scanner: Covert countermeasures disrupt deception detection by functional magnetic resonance imaging. NeuroImage PMID: 21111834

Genes To Brains To Minds To... Murder?

A group of Italian psychiatrists claim to explain How Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics Improve Psychiatric Assessment: Report on a Violent Murder Case.

The paper presents the horrific case of a 24 year old woman from Switzerland who smothered her newborn son to death immediately after giving birth in her boyfriend's apartment. After her arrest, she claimed to have no memory of the event. She had a history of multiple drug abuse, including heroin, from the age of 13.

Forensic psychiatrists were asked to assess her case and try to answer the question of whether "there was substantial evidence that the defendant had an irresistible impulse to commit the crime." The paper doesn't discuss the outcome of the trial, but the authors say that in their opinion she exhibits a pattern of "pathologically impulsivity, antisocial tendencies, lack of planning...causally linked to the crime, thus providing the basis for an insanity defense."

But that's not all. In the paper, the authors bring neuroscience and genetics into the case in an attempt to provide

a more “objective description” of the defendant’s mental disease by providing evidence that the disease has “hard” biological bases. This is particularly important given that psychiatric symptoms may be easily faked as they are mostly based on the defendant’s verbal report.

So they scanned her brain, and did DNA tests for 5 genes which have been previously linked to mental illness, impulsivity, or violent behaviour. What happened? Apparently her brain has "reduced gray matter volume in the left prefrontal cortex" - but that was compared to just 6 healthy control women. You really can't do this kind of analysis on a single subject, anyway.

As for her genes, well, she had genes. On the famous and much-debated 5HTTLPR polymorphism, for example, her genotype was long/short; while it's true that short is generally considered the "bad" genotype, something like 40% of white people, and an even higher proportion of East Asians, carry it. The situation was similar for the other four genes (STin2 (SCL6A4), rs4680 (COMT), MAOA-uVNTR, DRD4-2/11, for gene geeks).

I've previously posted about cases in which a well-defined disorder of the brain led to criminal behaviour. There was the man who became obsessed with child pornography following surgical removal of a tumour in his right temporal lobe. There are the people who show "sociopathic" behaviour following fronto-temporal degeneration.

However this woman's brain was basically "normal" at least as far as a basic MRI scan could determine. All the pieces were there. Her genotypes was also normal in that lots of normal people carry the same genes; it's not (as far as we know) that she has a rare genetic mutation like Brunner syndrome in which an important gene is entirely missing. So I don't think neurobiology has much to add to this sad story.

*

We're willing to excuse perpetrators when there's a straightforward "biological cause" for their criminal behaviour: it's not their fault, they're ill. In all other cases, we assign blame: biology is a valid excuse, but nothing else is.

There seems to be a basic difference between the way in which we think about "biological" as opposed to "environmental" causes of behaviour. This is related, I think, to the Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations and our fascination with brain scans that "prove that something is in the brain". But when you start to think about it, it becomes less and less clear that this distinction works.

A person's family, social and economic background is the strongest known predictor of criminality. Guys from stable, affluent families rarely mug people; some men from poor, single-parent backgrounds do. But muggers don't choose to be born into that life any more than the child-porn addict chose to have brain cancer.

Indeed, the mugger's situation is a more direct cause of his behaviour than a brain tumour. It's not hard to see how a mugger becomes, specifically, a mugger: because they've grown up with role-models who do that; because their friends do it or at least condone it; because it's the easiest way for them to make money.

But it's less obvious how brain damage by itself could cause someone to seek child porn. There's no child porn nucleus in the brain. Presumably, what it does is to remove the person's capacity for self-control, so they can't stop themselves from doing it.

This fits with the fact that people who show criminal behaviour after brain lesions often start to eat and have (non-criminal) sex uncontrollably as well. But that raises the question of why they want to do it in the first place. Were they, in some sense, a pedophile all along? If so, can we blame them for that?

Rigoni D, Pellegrini S, Mariotti V, Cozza A, Mechelli A, Ferrara SD, Pietrini P, & Sartori G (2010). How neuroscience and behavioral genetics improve psychiatric assessment: report on a violent murder case. Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience, 4 PMID: 21031162

Genes To Brains To Minds To... Murder?

A group of Italian psychiatrists claim to explain How Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics Improve Psychiatric Assessment: Report on a Violent Murder Case.

The paper presents the horrific case of a 24 year old woman from Switzerland who smothered her newborn son to death immediately after giving birth in her boyfriend's apartment. After her arrest, she claimed to have no memory of the event. She had a history of multiple drug abuse, including heroin, from the age of 13.

Forensic psychiatrists were asked to assess her case and try to answer the question of whether "there was substantial evidence that the defendant had an irresistible impulse to commit the crime." The paper doesn't discuss the outcome of the trial, but the authors say that in their opinion she exhibits a pattern of "pathologically impulsivity, antisocial tendencies, lack of planning...causally linked to the crime, thus providing the basis for an insanity defense."

But that's not all. In the paper, the authors bring neuroscience and genetics into the case in an attempt to provide

a more “objective description” of the defendant’s mental disease by providing evidence that the disease has “hard” biological bases. This is particularly important given that psychiatric symptoms may be easily faked as they are mostly based on the defendant’s verbal report.

So they scanned her brain, and did DNA tests for 5 genes which have been previously linked to mental illness, impulsivity, or violent behaviour. What happened? Apparently her brain has "reduced gray matter volume in the left prefrontal cortex" - but that was compared to just 6 healthy control women. You really can't do this kind of analysis on a single subject, anyway.

As for her genes, well, she had genes. On the famous and much-debated 5HTTLPR polymorphism, for example, her genotype was long/short; while it's true that short is generally considered the "bad" genotype, something like 40% of white people, and an even higher proportion of East Asians, carry it. The situation was similar for the other four genes (STin2 (SCL6A4), rs4680 (COMT), MAOA-uVNTR, DRD4-2/11, for gene geeks).

I've previously posted about cases in which a well-defined disorder of the brain led to criminal behaviour. There was the man who became obsessed with child pornography following surgical removal of a tumour in his right temporal lobe. There are the people who show "sociopathic" behaviour following fronto-temporal degeneration.

However this woman's brain was basically "normal" at least as far as a basic MRI scan could determine. All the pieces were there. Her genotypes was also normal in that lots of normal people carry the same genes; it's not (as far as we know) that she has a rare genetic mutation like Brunner syndrome in which an important gene is entirely missing. So I don't think neurobiology has much to add to this sad story.

*

We're willing to excuse perpetrators when there's a straightforward "biological cause" for their criminal behaviour: it's not their fault, they're ill. In all other cases, we assign blame: biology is a valid excuse, but nothing else is.

There seems to be a basic difference between the way in which we think about "biological" as opposed to "environmental" causes of behaviour. This is related, I think, to the Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations and our fascination with brain scans that "prove that something is in the brain". But when you start to think about it, it becomes less and less clear that this distinction works.

A person's family, social and economic background is the strongest known predictor of criminality. Guys from stable, affluent families rarely mug people; some men from poor, single-parent backgrounds do. But muggers don't choose to be born into that life any more than the child-porn addict chose to have brain cancer.

Indeed, the mugger's situation is a more direct cause of his behaviour than a brain tumour. It's not hard to see how a mugger becomes, specifically, a mugger: because they've grown up with role-models who do that; because their friends do it or at least condone it; because it's the easiest way for them to make money.

But it's less obvious how brain damage by itself could cause someone to seek child porn. There's no child porn nucleus in the brain. Presumably, what it does is to remove the person's capacity for self-control, so they can't stop themselves from doing it.

This fits with the fact that people who show criminal behaviour after brain lesions often start to eat and have (non-criminal) sex uncontrollably as well. But that raises the question of why they want to do it in the first place. Were they, in some sense, a pedophile all along? If so, can we blame them for that?

Rigoni D, Pellegrini S, Mariotti V, Cozza A, Mechelli A, Ferrara SD, Pietrini P, & Sartori G (2010). How neuroscience and behavioral genetics improve psychiatric assessment: report on a violent murder case. Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience, 4 PMID: 21031162